Sprint v. Mendelsohn

Bill Long 2/26/08

SUMMARY OF FEBRUARY 26, 2008 DECISION

This is a strange decision. Why? Well, you had a US District Court judge conclude that evidence of age-discrimination in firing Ms. Mendelsohn was inadmissible unless it came from employees who were "similarly situated" to her. This meant, for the court, that the employees had to have the same ultimate supervisor. Well, the Court of Appeals reversed that judgment, concluding that the District Court had impermissibly declared a per se rule in employment discrimination cases--that only people with the same supervisor could be witnesses for each other in age discrimination trials. The Court of Appeals then said that broader evidence was permissible--and that evidence confined to the same supervisor only was the rule in disciplinary rather than dismissal cases.

When you have a case of this type, you generally get a split Supreme Court. But, in fact, the Court unanimously decided the case on a completely different ground than either side briefed or expected. In short, they said that the Court of Appeals had erred by reading the District Court's decision as a per se rule. The Court of Appeals ought to have remanded the case to the District Court to see if it was articulating a per se rule or not.

Ok, this is what the Supreme Court "held," and it doesn't mean that much, but we can go along with it. But then the Court, in a final brief paragraph, said that in cases like this it is impossible to come up with a per se rule. Thus, the Court has already decided the question it is asking the District Court to decide on remand. Here is the final paragraph of the Court's decision today--see what you make of it.

"The question whether evidence of discrimination by other supervisors is relevant in an individual ADEA case is fact based and depends on many factors, including how closely related the evidence is to the plaintiff's circumstances and theory of the case. Applying Rule 403 to determine if evidence is prejudicial also requires a fact-intensive, context-specific inquiry. Because Rules 401 and 403 do not make such evidence per se admissible or per se inadmissible, and because the inquiry required by those Rules is within the province of the District Court in the first instance, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case with instructions to have the District Court clarify the basis for its evidentiary ruling under the applicable Rules."

Thinking About the Case

So, what is the District Court supposed to do on remand? Of course it will just say that it can't apply a per se rule. But the Supreme Court held that the District Court, in the first instance, didn't apply a per se rule anyhow. Here is what Justice Thomas (writing for the unanimous Court) says:

"The minute order included only two sentences discussing the admissibility of the evidence:

“Plaintiff may offer evidence of discrimination against Sprint employees who are similarly situated to her. ‘Similarly situated employees,’ for the purpose of this ruling, requires proof that (1) Paul Ruddick [sic] was the decision-maker in any adverse employment action; and (2) temporal proximity.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 24a.

Because Sprint had cited the Aramburu case in its motion in limine, which held that employees may be similarly situated only if they had the same supervisor, the Court of Appeals thought that the District Court was applying a per se rule. But the Supreme Court went on to say:

"Contrary to the Court of Appeals' conclusion, these sentences include no analysis suggesting that the District Court applied a per se rule excluding this type of evidence."

Left With Confusion

So what is a court to do on remand? I think it must conclude there is no per se rule about admissibility of evidence in age-discrimination cases. But where does it go from there? Can it even entertain a motion in limine from Sprint to exclude testimony of supervisors? That is, if the investigation is so "fact-intensive," can't an argument be made that no motion in limine would be "fact-intensive" enough to allow exclusion of testimony. How about at the motion to dismiss stage? How about at summary judgment? The last paragraph of the Court's decision seems to suggest that evidence of discrimination by other supervisors may be relevant on some occasions. But it doesn't clarify when those occasions are. It would seem to me, then, that the Court's decision gets us almost nowhere--except back to square one, where the District Court could write the same two sentences, and the Court of Appeals could reverse on almost the same grounds (even if it doesn't accuse the District Court of using a per se rule). Isn't there a movie, in which Bill Murray is the star, that allowed for repeated events like this??

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