John R. Sand & Gravel Decision

I can easily report what the Court decided in this case, and I will do so presently. But, as my comment below will show, I think this is a terribly unsatisfying decision, since it largely ignores the substance of the case below. But let's first play this case "straight," and then get to my comments.

By a 7-2 majority (opinion by Breyer; dissent by Stevens and Ginsburg), the US Supreme Court held that the six-year "accrual" statute of limitations in the Tucker Act (28 USC sec. 2501) must be considered by the Court of Federal Claims and Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit even though both parties to the appeal had agreed in the court below that the six-year period had accrued in 1998, and that therefore the case was timely filed. The effect of the Supreme Court's decision was to uphold the Appellate court's determination that the claim actually accrued in 1994, thus making Sand's lawsuit untimely. Thus, the six-year limitations period in the Tucker Act is, in accordance to the language of the Court, "jurisdictional" and not merely "claims processing."

The Court's Decision--from the Syllabus

The syllabus (summary prepared by the Court's staff) describes the issue this way:

"In a Court of Federal Claims action, petitioner argued that various federal activities on land for which it held a mining lease amounted to an unconstitutional taking of its leasehold rights. The Government initially asserted that the claims were untimely under the court of claims statute of limitations, but later effectively conceded that issue and won on the merits. Although the Government did not raise timeliness on appeal, the Federal Circuit addressed the issue sua sponte, finding the action untimely.
Held: The court of claims statute of limitations requires sua sponte consideration of a lawsuit's timeliness, despite the Government's waiver of the issue."

In making its case, the Court relied on precedents from as long ago as 1883 to interpret the statute as setting out a more absolute or "jurisdictional" limitations period. For example, in 1883, the Court concluded with regard to the current statute's precedessor that "it was the duty of the court to raise the timeliness question whether it was done by plea or not," citing Kendall v. US, 107 US 123, 125-126 (1883). Thus, the petitioner could succeed in its claim only if it convinced the Court that the Court had overturned, or should overturn, its earlier precedent.

The Court then examined several of of its precedents and concluded they had not been overruled. Both the Irwin case, 489 US 89 and the Franconia Associates case, 536 US 129, the Court argued, had more to do with "claims processing" rules than jurisdictional rules. Thus, the principle of stare decisis requres that the Court adhere to its earlier precedents and consider the six-year limitations period to be jurisdictional rather than claims-processing.

Trying to Understand What I Just Heard

The issue in this case was the propriety of the appellate court's bringing up and deciding the case on statute of limitations grounds when both sides had agreed on 1998 as the time in which the plaintiff's claim had accrued. The appellate court, in fact, had decided on its own decision (the Latin is sua sponte) not only that it could take up the six year accrual rule when neither side had briefed the issue but that they could decide on a date four years earlier than the date agreed upon by the parties as the date of accrual, thus making John R.'s case untimely (since it wasn't filed until 2002). Even though I can agree in the abstract that the six year accrual period of the Tucker Act can be appealed to at any time in the process (and thus technically agree with the US Supreme Court), doesn't it make a bit more sense that if you are going to throw a litigant out of court on a ground that neither he nor the government has briefed (because they agreed it wasn't relevant), that you at least put the hearing off for a few months and let both sides brief the issue again before you? Thus, I don't object so much to the six year accrual period being able to be taken up at any stage of the proceedings (i.e., you can't "waive" it and then have the matter disappear); I object to the result of this--that courts make decisions "out of left field" on grounds that not even the litigants expected. When the Supreme Court then upholds the decision of the lower Court to do this, isn't it in fact supporting a practice of law that has unfair written all over it?

If statute of limitations issues are "jurisdictional," as here, then they can not only, but must be considered at every subsequent stage of the proceedings. A lower decision that they were well-within the time limit for filing should then not matter so much, since the matter can continually be brought up. After all, if litigants were both wrong in ignoring the issue before the appellate court, why isn't the trial court potentially wrong in deciding a limitations issue in the way it did?

So, even though I can agree (well, I sort of have to, since it is now the law of the land) with the Court that the Tucker Act's accrual limitation period can be brought up at any time in the proceedings, I think that when it is done, it should be done in the interests of justice--where everyone has a chance to brief the issue. Otherwise, we have decisions from left field...

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