US v. Rodriguez....serious drug offense under armed career criminal act

To no one's surprise, the Supreme Court (6-3 decision, Alito writing for the Court) reversed the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals and held that, for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"--the statute is described in the summary of the case), a state statute that allows for a 10-year maximum prison term for recidivist violations (where the first-time crime would only carry a 5-year maximum) must be taken into consideration for sentencing enhancement purposes under the ACCA. The Ninth Circuit's previous precedent provided that when considering a prison term imposed for a prior offense:

"we must consider the sentence available for the crime itself, without considering separate recidivist sentencing enhancements."

The Supreme Court disagreed. In this essay I will briefly summarize relevant facts from the case as well as the crucial argument made by Justice Alito--that the plain language of the statute doesn't support the Ninth Circuit interpretation.

A Few Key Facts

From the Syllabus of the opinion, we have the following:

"Upon respondent's federal conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), he had three prior Washington state convictions for delivery of a controlled substance. At the time of those convictions, Washington law specified a maximum 5-year prison term for the first such offense. A recidivist provision, however, set a 10-year ceiling for a second or subsequent offense, and the state court had sentenced respondent to concurrent 48-month sentences on each count. The Government contended in the federal felon-in-possession case that respondent should be sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), § 924(e), which sets a 15-year minimum sentence “[i]n the case of a person who violates [§ 922(g) ] and has three previous convictions ... for a ... serious drug offense,” § 924(e)(1). Because a state drug-trafficking conviction qualifies as “a serious drug offense” if “a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law” for the “offense,” § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii), and the maximum term on at least two of respondent's Washington crimes was 10 years under the state recidivist provision, the Government argued that these convictions had to be counted under ACCA. The District Court disagreed, holding that the “maximum term of imprisonment” for § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) purposes is determined without reference to recidivist enhancements. The Ninth Circuit affirmed."

The Statute and Its Interpretation

The language of 18 USC sec. 924( e)(2)(A)(ii) defines a "serious drug offense" as:

"(ii) an offense under State law, involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)), for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law."

At trial and on appeal the Government argued that the language of this section would include recidivist sentencing provisions of state law as well as sentencing provisions for the actual crime. Justice Alito wrote:

"The Government's reading is compelled by the language of ACCA. For present purposes, there are three key statutory terms: “offense,” “law,” and “maximum term.” The “offense” in each of the drug-delivery cases was a violation of §§ 69.50.401(a)(ii)-(iv). The relevant “law” is set out in both that provision, which prescribes a “maximum term” of five years for a first “offense,” and § 69.50.408(a), which prescribes a “maximum term” of 10 years for a second or subsequent “offense.” Thus, in this case, the maximum term prescribed by Washington law for at least two of respondent's state drug offenses was 10 years."

The Ninth Circuit's reading of the law, where a person could actually be serving a sentence longer than the "maximum term of imprisonment...prescribed by law" (say, if a person was serving six years under the recidivist statute for a crime whose underlying maximum sentence was five years), made no sense-- it "contorts ACCA's plain terms."

Not only was the Ninth Circuit's ruling deficient in this way, but it was also "inconsistent with the way in which the concept of the 'maximum term of imprisonment' is customarily understood by participants in the criminal justice process." He gave this hypothetical:

"Suppose that a defendant who indisputably had more than three prior convictions for “violent felon[ies]” or “serious drug offense[s]” was charged in federal court with violating the felon-in-possession statute. Under ACCA, this defendant would face a sentence of “not less than 15 years.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2000 ed., Supp. V). Suppose that the defendant asked his or her attorney, “What's the maximum term I face for the new offense?” An attorney aware of ACCA would surely not respond, “10 years,” even though 10 years is the maximum sentence without the ACCA enhancement. See § 924(a)(2) (2000 ed.)."

The Dissent

The three dissenters were from the Court's "liberal bloc"--Justices Souter, Stevens, and Ginsburg. Justice Breyer, often agreeing with them, sided with the majority this time. The dissenters' major argument was that the statute was ambiguous and that, in criminal law, an ambiguous statute was treated by the rule of lenity--opting for the lesser sentence. Justice Souter wrote:

"The Court chooses one reading of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2000 ed. and Supp. V), over another that would make at least as much sense of the statute's ambiguous text and would follow the counsel of a tradition of lenity in construing perplexing criminal laws. The Court's choice, moreover, promises hard times for the trial courts that will have to make the complex sentencing calculations this decision demands."

But their dissent was in vain. This is the wrong Court for those seeking leniency in criminal sentences.

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