Logan v. United States and Armed Career Criminal Act

This is a criminal sentencing case as it relates to the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"). The Begay and Rodriquez cases, argued in January 2008, also deal with the ACCA. Something is "up" on criminal sentencing in this country now; I think it arises from our realization that criminal sentences are "enhanced" by a number of factors that result in potentially disproportionate sentences for people who have done the same crimes. To some extent we don't have problems with that--indeed, someone who carries a gun and has already served prison time for violent crimes may indeed, in our mind, deserve more prison time than one who is carrying a gun in a crime for the first time. But the problem with sentence enhancements, which is what the ACCA does, is that it can sometimes lead to results that seem unduly harsh or that you haven't anticipated. Is the Logan case such an instance?

The Logan case, from WI (7th Circuit decision is at 453 F3d 804 (2006)), is, from one angle, a very simple case. If you just "read the law" you come up with a defensible and easy interpretation of the law. But the reason the Supreme Court wanted to hear the case is that this "simple" reading was ignored by one circuit (the 1st) as not making sense. So, here you have it--

Facts and Law of Logan's Case

Logan was indicted by a federal grand jury in June 2005 on a one-count indictment that alleged possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 USC sec. 922(g)(1). He pled guilty to the crime. The plea agreement set fort the maximum penalty at ten years. But then, as is normally the case, the pre-sentence report (PSR) came in. It indicated that Logan might qualify as an armed career criminal under the ACCA, for whom enhanced penalties (a minimum 15 year sentence) would apply under 18 USC sec. 924(e)(1). Well, what do you need to "trigger" the ACCA? You need three prior felony convictions for drug offenses or "violent felonies."

But, as with anything in law, you have to define what you mean. A "violent felony," under the law in question, is a crime "punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year," 18 USC 921 (e)(2)(B). Ok, now we are getting somewhere. But, wait, there is more. Just because something is punishable for a term exceeding one year doesn't mean that anything punishable for a term exceeding one year is a violent felony. Huh? Because you have to dig deeper into the statute to realize that a "crime punishable by one year," is also defined in the law. What is it? Here it is:

"The term “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” does not include-

(B) any State offense classified by the laws of the State as a misdemeanor and punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less," 18 USC 921(a)(20).

Let's pause for a second. I think we should understand by now how this ACCA works [it enhances punishment if you commit three violent crimes], but you could be excused for wondering if law is really that straightforward when "one" is defined as "two." It makes it quite easy to understand how a legally-trained President can muse on what the definition of "is" "is."

But still we don't have our case yet. For the statute just quoted goes on to say:

"What constitutes a conviction of such a crime shall be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held. Any conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored shall not be considered a conviction for purposes of this chapter," Id.

Getting to the Issue of the Case

Mr. Logan had three prior misdemeanor convictions for battery in Wisconsin, and, because he was a repeat offender, each of them carried with them the possibility of imprisonment for three years. Thus, he seems to fall under the ACCA. But his counsel decided that the only way he might be able to get out of the more severe sentence was to appeal to the language of "has had civil rights restored" in the just-bolded statute. That is, the three batteries would not be considered "violent felonies" for ACCA purposes if the convicted person has "had civil rights restored." No case defines precisely what "civil rights" means, but most people conclude that it is the right to vote, to sit on a jury and to hold office.

Well, Logan's lawyer recognized that Logan technically didn't have his civil rights restored because they never were taken away from him in the first place as a result of his convictions. But, he argued, for a statute to allow a person to get out of the effects of the ACCA whose civil rights have been taken away and then restored must also include the person whose civil rights were never taken away in the first place. Otherwise, the worse criminal (i.e., you are worse if your civil rights were actually taken away) would get the benefit of the statute and not be sentenced to 15 years minimum under the ACCA and the better criminal (i.e., one whose civil rights were never taken away) would get clobbered by the ACCA. How fair is that?

Conclusion

Well, the 7th Circuit wasn't amused by Mr. Logan's lawyer's argument. They weren't really into his abstract concept of "fairness." What mattered for them was the meaning of the word "restore." If your civil rights are never taken away, how can they be "restored?" Thus, Mr. Logan never fit into the meaning of the statute. The Supreme Court needs to decide if the word "restore" can be stretched in the way that Logan desires. Don't count on it.

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