Indiana v. Edwards--and Self-Representation

This case, on competency to conduct one's own defense in a criminal trial, implicates not only the federal constitution and various Supreme Court cases, but opens up the fascinating issue of whether a defendant can have additional protections under a state statute or a state constitution than provided him under the US Constitution. While the case doesn't directly implicate the so-called "state constitutional revolution" begun under the influence of Professor, then Justice, Hans Linde of Oregon, the question presented invites consideration of the independent value of state statutes or constitutions--independent, that is, of the US Constitution. In order for this to make sense, we need to understand the sad facts of Edwards' case.

Factual Background

On July 12, 1999 Edwards fired three gunshots after having been confronted on a downtown Indianapolis street by a department store loss prevention officer who had seen Edwards steal a pair of shoes. One shot grazed the officer. Edwards fled but was tracked down by a special FBI agent, where he was trapped in a parking garage, shot in the thigh and taken into custody. Edwards was charged with four criminal counts: (1) attempted murder; (2) battery with a deadly weapon; (3) criminal recklessness; and (4) theft.

Then the fun began. Two independent psychiatrists found Edwards to be schizophrenic and the trial court judge declared him incompetent to stand trial. Then, in 2001, he was evaluated at Logansport State Hospital and found competent to stand trial. However, in Nov. 2003 the trial court ordered another independent evaluation and learned that these psychiatrists found him incompetent to stand trial. Yet, he returned to Logansport, where another staff psychiatrist in July 2004 found him competent to stand trial. This is driving you crazy, isn't it?

On the strength of the last finding, Edwards went to trial. But, he then asked to represent himself at trial. The trial court denied the request because Edwards had already stated his intention to raise insanity as a defense. An interesting tableau, don't you think? A guy who is competent to stand trial, conducting his own defense, and trying to get the jury to find him insane? So, that is why the trial court stepped in and said he couldn't conduct his own defense. Then, he went to trial in June 2005 with appointed counsel. He was convicted of criminal recklessness and theft, but the jury hung on the issues of attempted murder and battery with a deadly weapon. The judge declared a mistrial on these two charges and scheduled a new trial for August 2005.

Edwards repeatedly then moved to represent himself pro se at this new trial, and his attorney petitioned to withdraw from the case (indeed, wouldn't you?). The court finally denied Edwards' motion, and he proceeded to trial on the two remaining counts at the end of 2005. Thus, in a nutshell, the court found that Edwards was competent to stand trial but lacked the additional capacity required to conduct a defense.

After a three-day trial, Edwards was convicted of the two remaining charges. The judge threw the book at him, figuratively speaking, and Edwards was sentenced to 30 years in prison. Edwards then appealed, arguing that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation at this second trial. The Indiana Court of Appeals agreed with him and reversed and remanded the case for retrial of the attempted murder and battery counts. After some more procedural wrangling, the case made it to the US Supreme Court.

The Case Before the US Supreme Court

The framing of the issue in the courts below and in the briefs submitted to the Supreme Court helps us focus on the important question for this case. Indiana argues that if a person is competent to stand trial that doesn't necessarily mean that he is competent to present a meaningful defense. The State argues that due process and fundamental fairness of a criminal trial are overriding considerations that limit the right to self-representation. On the other hand, Edwards argues that the Sixth Amendment to the US Constitution guarantees an accused the right to self-representation. Period. He argues that the standard for competence to stand trail is the same as the standard for competence to waive the right to counsel. If he is competent to stand trial, he ought to be competent to conduct his own defense.

The Supreme Court has actually weighed in on this question. In two cases, one from 1975 (Faretta v. CA, 422 US 806) and one from 1993 (Godinez v. Moran, 509 US 389), the Court held that the standard of competence to waive the right to counsel is the same as the standard of competence to stand trial. The Godinez Court did warn, however:

"A finding that a defendant is competent to stand trial, however, is not all that is necessary before he may be permitted to ... waive his right to counsel. In addition to determining that a defendant who seeks to ... waive counsel is competent, a trial court must satisfy itself that the waiver of his constitutional rights is knowing and voluntary. In this sense there is a “heightened” standard for ... waiving the right to counsel, but it is not a heightened standard of competence," Godinez, at 400-401.

Thus, the US Supreme Court standard on the issue is that competence of representation is not an issue--all that is needed for a person competent to stand trial to represent himself pro se is a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel.

So, you might be saying, well, isn't this case a slam-dunk then? If the US Supreme Court says that the federal Sixth Amendment says nothing about the competency of a pro se defense, why is there a case? Precisely because the Supreme Court wants to consider if the State of Indiana and, by extension, any state, can give additional protections to a defendant than the US Supreme Court. Or, to look at it differently, the Court wants to know if the State can define the right to pro se representation more narrowly than the US Supreme Court. Hence, we now understand the way that the Supreme Court redefined the question in the petition for certiorari and granted cert on this question alone:

"May States adopt a higher standard for measuring competency to represent oneself at trial than for measuring competency to stand trial?”

Thus, this case will implicate issues of federalism and not simply the issues of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the Sixth Amendment. I think it will be an exciting case, whose result is absolutely up in the air. To show how this issue divides people right down the middle, we only need to know that in the 1975 case, both Blackmun (a liberal) and Rehnquist (the most conservative member) agreed in dissent and stated that defendants had to have additional protections than simple mental competency in order to conduct their defense. Thus, the outcome is anything but certain...

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