The Presidential Election of 1800: Fifth Essay

As I think you will agree (from the previous essay), a pretty remarkable state of affairs obtained when the SC Legislature convened on December 1, 1800 to select its Electors. Though we know now that the Electoral votes were divided 65/65 between the leaders of the two respective parties, the people of that day could not have known this. The canvass of RI's votes may not have been completed until some time after its Nov. 19 election. PA's "news" was not known in SC when the SC Legislature met. And, in fact, it took at least two or three weeks for the "smoke to clear" after the Electors cast their votes on December 3 for people to learn what actually happened.

South Carolina posed the most interesting tableau. In 1796 its Electors had cast their votes for Jefferson and native son Thomas Pinckney, a Federalist. This divided allegiance was not unusual in 1796, and it resulted in a Federalist President (John Adams) and a Republican Vice-President (Thomas Jefferson). Many observers thought that SC would split its vote again in 1800, though in fact the concept of political party had begun to emerge in the interim, and it was increasingly unlikely, as in 1796, that electors might "split" their ticket. But, if they did, this would mean that Jefferson would probably finish with 73 votes and a Federalist with 73 votes. But who would that Federalist be? Most would think that Adams, the President, would be the choice of South Carolinians, but, lo and behold, SC had another Federalist favorite son on the ballot--another Pinckney--and he was far more popular in SC than was the remote John Adams. This Pinckney was Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, one of the American "heroes" of the XYZ affair of 1797 and the votes seemed to be his to lose. So, according to the few electoral "pundits" in the year 1800, it seemed likely that both Jefferson and Pinckney would be thrown over the top, with more than 70 electoral votes each.

A Possible Scenario

This might have led to the following fantastic scenario. If all Electors kept to party loyalty (and we know that one didn't, but this was not known until Feb. 11, when Jefferson, of all people, because of his position as President of the Senate actually opened the electoral votes), then it was distinctly possible that Jefferson and Pinckney would each have 73 electoral votes. The House of Representatives would then have chosen a President from the two of them. But it would have been the Congress elected in 1798, and not 1800 (which wouldn't begin its service until March 4, 1801) which would choose the next President. Though each state only received one vote, the 1798 Congress was divided as follows: Federalist 60 members and Republican 46 members. The Congress elected in 1800 would have 68 Republican and 38 Federalist members. In other words, politics had changed dramatically in 1800, but the 1798 realities, so to speak, would pick the President in February 1801. Thus, the lame duck, outgoing and rejected House would be choosing the new President. Of course this scenario didn't play out, but it is interesting to follow the numbers and the possibilities....

Back to "Reality"

What actually happened in SC in the voting in Dec. 1800 is one for the record books. A disaffected cousin of Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, also named Charles Pinckney (1757-1824), who already had a few decades of distinguished service as Governor, US Senator and state legislator, had left his Federalist roots in the 1790s to become a Republican and now was so dedicated to the ascendency of that party in the traditionally Federalist SC that he would do almost anything to deliver the state to Jefferson and Burr. But he had to do it by making sure that his cousin got no votes. Republican Charles, whom his relatives called "blackguard Charlie," vigorously canvassed the state, stirring up Republicans who mostly were "upcountry" folk (Charleston was the Federalist bastion), and ended up delivering the state for Jefferson and Burr. Helping him in this effort was the publication of an "indiscreet" letter written by John Adams in the early 1790s describing the Pinckney clan as treacherous, deceitful and so pro-English as not to be trusted if an international problem with England arose. Republican Charles managed to use this and other things to stoke significant anti-Federalist feeling.

His "heroic" effort would eventually get him the Ambassadorship to Spain, a crucial appointment in Jefferson's administration (since Spain still held New World possessions), but the irony of all of this was that Pinckney went nearly bankrupt while in Spain (1802-06) because of the mismanagement of his plantations back home.

Since Republican Charles delivered SC into the "R" column, when the electoral votes were cast on Dec. 3, the results were 73 for Jefferson and Burr, 65 for Adams, 64 for Pinckney and 1 for John Jay. As you read various accounts of that election, you realize that it only gradually dawned on people through the month of December 1800 what the situation was. By December 15, it was becoming clear that Jefferson and Burr were tied, and that the Federalist-controlled House of Representatives would have to choose one of them for President. Or, would it? That would become the problem over the next two months, as various scenarios were suggested of what might happen. Here are a few.

A Few Scenarios on Jefferson and Burr

Even though the Federalists controlled the House of Representatives, they didn't control enough states (9) to be able to force their will on the Republicans. That is, the President would be selected in the House by states. Mighty Virginia would have as many votes as miniscule Delaware. This led to lots of maneuvering. Perhaps, some thought, the Federalists should just use their power to prevent the naming of a President. Then, what would happen? Various constitutional scenarios were played out, but a reasonable one would be that there would be no President until Congress met in Dec. 1801. Or, they might pass a statute naming one of their own as a sort of "interim President." Or, they might try to get the election done all over again. Or, they might, and this was the most realistic option, try to play off Jefferson against Burr to see who would promise the Federalists the most and then support that man. Because the Electors couldn't specify on their ballots whom they favored for President or VP, the House of Representatives had to make that determination.

So, there was horse-trading galore, or offers of horse-trading, in the weeks following mid-December. Aaron Burr at first declined all interest in the Presidency (the "good soldier" approach), but most Federalists tended to see him as less threatening to their interests than Thomas Jefferson. In addition, Jefferson was little better than a "heathen" to the Federalists while at least Burr was dripping in traditional religion on both sides of the family (his father was a Presbyterian minister; his grandfather--Jonathan Edwards--the leading colonial theologian). In the end it would be one vote of the Federalist from Delaware that broke a logjam that developed in the House of Representatives when it met on February 11 to chose the President. But that is the story for a later essay.

I think it might be helpful now to write one essay on where Aaron Burr was and what he was doing from Dec 1800 - Feb. 1801. Was this quintessential "schemer" hard at work for himself? For Jefferson? For anyone? The next essay explores this theme.

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