Republic Outline XX, Book IV
Prof. Bill Long 9/15/05
Finishing Book IV, 440a-444
S is in the midst of taking the "long road" to try to determine how many parts there are to the human soul, how they are to be described and to determine the relationship of these parts to the concept of justice. We saw that he has discovered an appetitive part and a rational part that are distinct from one another. We join him in 439e-440a on two questions: (1) whether a seeming third part, "by which we get angry" is actually a third part of the soul at all?; and (2) if it is a third part, is it "allied" with the reason or the appetites? Once he answers these questions he can ask the question of where justice resides in the individual.
The "Spirited" Part of the Soul
At first S seems to suggest that the spirited part of the soul, by which emotions are expressed, allies or is in interaction primarily with the appetites. He tells the memorable story of Leontius' unquenchable desire to look at corpses lying at the executioner's feet (439e). [We might liken this to our seeming inextinguishable longing to look at what is happening in car accidents]. He struggled with himself about whether to look at the corpses. Finally, "overpowered by the appetite," he rushed to the bodies and looked, saying, "Look for yourselves, you evil wretches (i.e., speaking to his eyes), take your fill of the beautiful sight" (440a). In other words, it appears that the emotion unsuccessfully trying to hold him back was connected to the appetites.
But then, he posits that in other circumstances spirit seems to ally itself with reason. "But I don't think you can say that you've ever seen spirit, either in yourself or anyone else, ally itself with an appetite to do what reason has decided must not be done" (440b). Spirit, in this case the emotion of anger, is not piqued if you suffer humiliation, hunger, etc. justly, but it is enraged if you endure these things at the hand of someone who has been unjust to you (440c-d). Socrates therefore changes his initial assessment:
"The position of the spirited part seems to be the opposite of what we thought before. Then we thought of it as something appetitive, but now we say that it is far from being that, for in the civil war in the soul it aligns itself more with the rational part" (440e).
Having answered the second question set out above, S is quickly able to dispatch of the first. "It isn't difficult to show that it (i.e., the spirited part) is different (from reason)" (441a). The fact that small children, who really have not developed their rational capabilities at all, are "full of spirit right from birth," shows that these are two distinct operations of the soul. Hence, S has proved his points: the soul is tripartite, and the spirited part is more closely connected to the reason than the appetitive part.*
[*Plato doesn't go into this point in much detail. I think he is focusing primarily on the nature of the guardian's or ruler's soul, and not that of a criminal.]
S is also aware that the major part of his argument is now over: "Well, then, we've now made our difficult way through the sea of argument. We are pretty much agreed that the same number and the same kinds of classes as are in the city are also in the soul of each individual" (441c).
Putting it All Together
Now that S has shown the parallel structure between city and soul organization, he is ready to ask about where justice is in the soul. He begins: "Moreover, Glaucon, I suppose we'll say that a man is just in the same way as a city" (441d). It follows then "we must also remember that each one of us in whom each part is doing his own work will himself be just and do his own" (441e). The rational part must rule, because it exercises foresight on behalf of the whole soul (441e).
What is significant for me is that S now returns to the images of stretching, nurturing and harmony to express the inner nature of justice. S says:
"And isn't it, as we were saying, a mixture of music and poetry, on the one hand, and physical training, on the other, that makes the two parts harmonious, stretching and nurturing the rational part with fine words and learning, relaxing the other part through soothing stories, and making it gentle by means of harmony and rhythm?" (441e-442a).
The two parts of the soul allied with each other, reason and spirit, watch over the appetitive part, the largest part in each person's soul, "to see that it isn't filled with the so-called pleasures of the body" (442a). Together reason and spirit form an impressive duo. They "do the finest job of guarding the whole soul and body against external enemies--reason by planning, spirt by fighting" (442b). We call a person courageous because of the spirited part and wise because of the rational part. But what is most important is the "community of all three parts" (442c). Moderation is this friendly relationship, then, between the parts of the soul.
Finally, S is ready for his last words on justice. Justice is not "indistinct" in us at all, because it isn't different from what they found in the city (442d). A just person has nothing to do with temple robberies or thefts, with adultery or disrespect for parents (443a). "And isn't the cause of all this that every part within him does its own work, whether it's ruling or being ruled?" (443b). Therefore it is right that the cobbler only practice cobblery and nothing else and the carpenter to stay in his realm. Then S concludes, with his long peroration to justice in 443d-444a, which shall complete this essay.
"And in truth justice is, it seems, something of this sort. However it isn't concerned with someone doing his own externally, but with what is inside him, with what is truly himself and his own. One who is just does not allow any part of himself to do the work of another part or allow the various classes within him to meddle with each other. He regulates well what is really his own and rules himself. He puts himself in order, is his own friend, and harmonizes the three parts of himself like three limiting notes in a musical scale--high, low, and middle. He binds together those parts and any others there may be in between, and from having been many things he becomes entirely one, moderate and harmonious. Only then does he act. And when he does anything, whether acquiring wealth, taking care of his body, engaging in politics, or in private contracts--in all of these, he believes that the action is just and fine that preserves this inner harmony and helps achieve it, and calls it so, and regards as wisdom the knowledge that oversees such actions. And he believes that the action that destroys this harmony is unjust, and calls it so, and regards the belief that oversees it as ignorance" (443d-444a).
Wow. Worth the price of the entire book.
1304
Copyright © 2004-2007 William R. Long
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