thomas aquinas and natural law and eternal law

The dual purposes of this essay are to restate some of Thomas' basic commitments or understandings with respect to law and then work through the content of Q's 92 and 95 (I will treat these questions in the next essay). In the former I seek to introduce (and reiterate) Thomas' manner of speaking, paying specific attention to the vocabulary he uses.

An Introductory Point

First, a word about Thomas as a person. I always find it helpful to ask, 'What type of person do we have here?' Or, alternatively, 'What is the "tone" of his work?' Is he basically morose? angry? optimistic? Skeptical about human capabilities? Does he stress divine grace? human sin? What is important for him? In brief I would argue that Thomas is optimistic and feels that humans, though plagued by sin, have the wherewithal to put together a life guided by reason that will lead to happiness in human society. In contrast to some earlier Catholic thinkers (like Augustine), who stress divine grace and human inability to live justly, Aquinas seems to take a much more positive view of human nature. You get the impression from him that if you just take the time to reason things out with the gifts God has given you (this is the way he would frame it), you can form a just society with good laws. His orderly work is a model for us patiently to seek order in our own lives. We have reason; use it in all areas of our lives. That is the message I get from Aquinas.

Thomas on Law

We need to understand his discussion of law in the context of his work as a whole. In this "First Part of the Second Part" he is discussing human acts. The "end" or goal (the Aristotelian term is "telos") of human life is happiness, and human reason is the means to move us to that end. Thus the acts we pursue lead us to that end. Following Aristotle, Thomas divides reason into speculative and practical reason. The former investigates necessary truths, such as the mathematical axioms or laws of nature, while the latter is concerned with contingent realities, such as arranging a society, forming laws, etc. Both reason and law are called a "rule and measure of acts." That is, both reason and law not only tell us what is required so that we can attain happiness, but they measure how we are doing in getting there.

Law, for Aquinas, is one of the two "extrinsic" means God has established to bring us to happiness. It is extrinsic because it is "out there," meaning it is outside of ourselves. The other is divine grace. There are "intrinsic" means to bring us to happiness, like virtue and habits, but they don't concern us here. So, his discussion of law takes place in the context of the external means God uses to lead us to happiness. We can see this emphasis, for example, in Q.95 where he asks whether it was useful that humans framed laws. Yes, he says, it was useful because law is a means by which we receive training in the perfection of virtue. Perfect Thomas.

How Natural Law Operates

Once we understand that law is designed to lead us to happiness, we can focus more specifically on the essence and types of law. That is what he does in QQ.90-97. He defines law neatly as "an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated" (Q.90.4, answer). There are four kinds or types of law: eternal, natural, human and divine. The first is essential to Thomas' scheme because it seeks to locate a sort of "form" of law in the mind of God. We don't have direct access to the eternal law, but we see its traces in the world, through "laws" that are behind the way nature operates. But, most significant for our purposes, we partake "somewhat" of the eternal law of God by its being "imprinted" on us. From this humans receive their "respective inclinations to their proper acts and ends" (Q.91.2, answer). "This participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the natural law (Id.). And, the basic principle of natural law is that "good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided" (Q.94.3, answer). Thus, the thing that anchors us to this earth--our commitment to do good and avoid evil, is something that is "imprinted" on us by the eternal law of God.

Previous essays define the differences among these four kinds of law. My purpose here is to stress his approach to natural law. Principles of natural law are discoverable by humans and they "are to the practical reason, what the first principles of demonstrations are to the speculative reason" (Q.94.2, answer). These principles are self-evident and discoverable by reason, even though the fact that something is self-evident doesn't mean that all can discern it. Sometimes there is an idea that is only self-evident to the wise because it requires an extended thinking process to get to the point (such as whether angels are located in only one place at a time). The difference between speculative and practical reason is that the former is focused on being while the latter is concerned with action. The action sought by the practical reason is the good; hence the first principle of natural law--that good is to be done and pursued and evil is to be avoided. Note that Thomas is trying to make a pretty big claim for this principle--it is imprinted in the mind of all humans everywhere, and will be the operative principle of human law.

We ought not to let this point pass without pausing for a moment. What is at stake here is Thomas' attempt to argue for a common human morality, a morality grounded in the fact that our natural inclination to do the good and avoid evil is actually imprinted on us by the eternal mind, a mind which, in this case, happens to be the Christian God (though there doesn't seem to be any reason why it has to be identified with this God; it could just as easily be the Stoic Logos). This is a very attractive position, I think, attractive to those who would like to argue that a certain position is right (or wrong) because nature says it is, or because we are "made" a certain way.

Dealing with a Potential Objection

But Thomas has to deal with the objection, to which every natural law thinker has to respond, about why there is so much cultural difference if all share the same imprint of the eternal law. Q.94.4 is is way of dealing with it. He says, "The practical reason...is busied with contingent matters, about which human actions are concerned; and consequently, although there is necessity in the general principles, the more we descend to matters of detail, the more frequently we encounter defects." And, continuing:

"But in matters of action, truth or practical rectitude is not the same for all, as to matters of detail, but only as to the general principles: and where there is the same rectitude in matters of detail, it is not equally known to all" (Q.94.4. answer).

Conclusion

The question I ended class with on 9/20 is the question I pose here. How much is common to all, and how much is "defect" or difference in culture? Thomas has provoked our thinking on this important issue.

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