INSURANCE LAW
Syllabus (2005)
*2006 Syl. (Spring)
*2006 Syl. (Fall)
Introduction
Warranty I
Warranty II
Warranty III
*Misrepresentation
*Misrep. II
AIDS (Waxse)
Contra Proferentem
*9/11 and Insurance
*9/11 and Ins. II
*9/11 and Ins. III
*9/11 and Ins. IV
*9/5/06 and Paper
Reasonable Exp.
Oregon Ins. Div.
*Ment. Parity
*Parity II
*Discrimination
Estoppel
Agency Theory
Armenian Genocide
Genocide II
Prop 103 (CA)
McCarran I
McCarran II
Hartford Fire
*Cont. Comm. Suit
*Contingent Comm.
*Katrina Lawsuit
Insurable Interest
Gossett
*Loss of Market
Homeowners Pol.
Paramount
Effic. Prox. Cause I
Effic. Prox Cause II
Recovery
Murder!
Imaginary Talk
Viatical Settlement
*ERISA preemption
*ERISA II
Incontestability
Goddard I
Goddard II
Goddard III
Goddard IV
Bad Faith
Bad Faith II
CGL I
CGL II
*Met Life (asbestos)
Expected Harm I
Expected Harm II
Owned Property Excl
Groundwater
Abs. Poll. Excl. I
Abs. Poll. Excl. II
History/Autos I
History/Autos II
*"Use" of a Vehicle
*"Use" of a Veh. II
*"Use" of Veh. III
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Misprepresentation on Application
Prof. Bill Long 1/2/06
American Income v. Hollins, 830 So2d 1230 (MS, 2002)
We are in the profession of law, but every once in a while we are reminded that in many ways we simply are sophisticated fact-gatherers, gatherers who seek to isolate one or two riveting or decisive facts to make a legal case. The case I discuss here (a 4-3 decision) implicates several important principles of insurance law, even if the application of these principles divided the Mississippi Supreme Court down the middle. These principles include misprepresentation on an insurance application, the role of the agent who fills out forms, the burden on the insured to read the policy and the application submitted, the ability of an insurer to rescind a policy and the standard of review for an award of punitive damages. But, above all, it is the facts that count.
A Few Facts
Hollins, born in 1962, had suffered from "female problems" since she was 17. She had a flare-up of abdominal pain and vaginal burning in 1991 and saw her physician on 10/1/91. The problem continued, and she sought emergency treatment on 1/2/92 and returned to her doctor on 1/6, 1/10 and 1/14/92. On 1/14 she met Jones, an agent for American Income Ins. ("AI"), whom she had met several years previously. He came to her home and filled out a hospital indemnity insurance application for her in response to answers she gave him. As she later testified at trial, she disclosed to him that her ovaries and fallopian tubes were infected, but that he apparently put down on the application only that she had gone to the physician for a "check up" on 1/14. She testified that Jones assured her that as long as she had not had surgery for her condition, she would be covered. In fact, the policy did not cover pre-existing conditions--i.e., conditions for which one had sought medical attention in the previous two years. Hollins signed the application, apparently not having read what Jones had written. The next day, Hollins went back to her doctor, and an ultrasound revealed fibroid tumors on her ovaries and bladder. She was eventually required to undergo surgery in November 1992. She filed a claim for partial reimbursement of her hospital stay in December 1992. In 1993 American Income discovered the facts of Hollins' situation and rescinded the policy. By the time the case reached trial (on whether AI had properly rescinded the policy), the agent had died, even though his deposition was available. Hollins had three witnesses who corroborated her story--family members and fiance who were in the room when Jones went over the application process with her. At trial the jury awarded Hollins $400 in compensatory damages (the policy only covered $100 per day for hospital stay) and $100,000 in punitive damages (for fraudulent action in rescinding the policy).
Legal Issues
As the majority and dissenters discussed legal issues, more facts came out. But let's just list a few of the legal principles. Listing them is easy. It is the application of the facts to the principles which is tough. Some of the principles are: (1) An applicant's misrepresentations in an insurance policy allow the company to rescind or void the policy if the misrepresentation is material. (2) If the agent "takes over" the application process, by filling out the forms, and the applicant gives truthful information which the agent "doctors" or "minimizes," there is no misrepresentation. (3) The fact that the applicant signs the application without reading it does not bar his/her attempt to prove that the answers in the policy didn't reflect the information given to the agent. (4) Where the agent's representations are opposed to the clear language of the policy, the company is not bound by its agent's representations. (5) An agent must be acting either with actual or apparent authority to bind the company.
But as you will see if you study this case or really any other case dealing with one or more of these issues, these principles function as sort of disembodied legal truths floating somewhere above the earth, which aggressive plaintiffs (insured) or defendants (insurer) will use to make their case. And, the factual accidents of life also contribute to a legal result. Who is to say that if Jones were alive and was able to rebut the testimony of Hollins and her family (by claiming that he, in fact, had written down exactly what she told him), the result might have been different? And, who is to say that there might not be a racial overlay in the case? It is never mentioned that Hollins is Black, but the dissent (which wanted to reverse the jury verdict) mentioned that she was a former biology student at Malcom X college in Chicago--probably not a destination college for kids from Lake Forest. So, you probably have running through the minds of justices the long history of racial issues in MS. Then, there is the fact that AI had issued several other policies of insurance to Hollins over the years, but knew from the applications in those policies that she had previous medical problems. How much should the insurer, therefore, be "on notice" when it already should have information in its files about some of the medical realities of its applicants? Thus you probably have enough to conclude from the facts of the case that Hollins and her family had every incentive to say that they fully disclosed her medical condition to Jones, but that Jones, for some reason, only indicated a "check up" on 1/14. The messy facts in this (and almost all) cases tend to make the seemingly clear legal principles nothing more than hooks on which to hang an argument--an argument that really is driven by construals of facts.
Conclusion
So, courts tend to emphasize one principle over another based on its perception of the important facts. In this case, it could have been that the Justices were ticked off at the seemingly nit-picking act of AI (rescind a policy rather than pay $400), and therefore let both the compensatory and punitive damages result stand.* The
[*Note that the punitive award here is 250X the compensatory award. A 2003 US Supreme Court case (Campbell) would limit the raio, except in extraordinary cases, to a single digit. Just think of the results had this case come down two years later...]
dissent, in contrast, rested most of its case on the clear language of the policy--that it precluded indemnification for pre-existing conditions. And so you have it, a 4-3 decision. Can we really say that this is "law?"
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