Troop Surge in Iraq

It is now no secret that the United States will commit around 21,000 additional troops to the War in Iraq over the next few months with the primary goal of stabilizing Baghdad from the sectarian war that has crippled the capital for the last two years. The sectarian war arose primarily because the US didn't have either the number of troops or infrastructure in place to deal with the chaos created in the capital by the military victory in May 2003. We let either the ghosts of Viet Nam (i.e., don't send in more than 200,000 troops or else we might be "trapped" into a long-term war with multiple casualties), which this Administration vowed to exorcise once and for all, or the lack of available troops to dictate our policy in Iraq from 2003-2006. Now, however, Bush and his advisors think that the additional troops will enable the Iraqi army to be sufficiently trained to quell sectarian violence and set Iraq on the road to "recovery," whatever that might mean. The purpose of this essay is not to assess this strategy: you will see that done daily in the news. What struck me, rather, is an irony in our policy suggested, but not commented on, by John Burns in his article today's NY Times.

The "Irony" of Cooperation

The irony of American involvement in Iraq which I want to point to today is that we, who wanted nothing of cooperation when we went into Iraq, against the advice of almost all smart internationally-savvy people, are now being forced to enter into a partnership which we don't really want. To understand this statement, we must first recall the heady days of 2002. We had been attacked on 9/11. We were not only going to attack Afghanistan in return but were going to make sure that Saddam Hussein came clean on Weapons of Mass Destruction. In fact, we were on a headlong course to topple him, and nothing would stop us--not a UN inspection team, not cautioning words from allies, nothing. We would go it alone because we were the big guys, the UN was a wimpy organization which coddled third-world criminals and others who wanted to hamper the work of freedom, and our national interests were at stake. No one was going to force US to play second-fiddle, or to lower ourselves to wait for the command instructions of the UN. We acted as if there was a "coalition of the willing," but, in fact, the effort in Iraq was primarily and American and British effort. We would get control and exercise it in the American way. We kicked butt. So there.

But the only problem is that there is a day after victory, and then a day after that. Winning the peace was much more difficulty than winning the war. And now, we are going to be "forced" into a military partnership, this time not with the UN but with the "lowly" Iraqi army. Here is what we know: This "partnership" is with the Iraqi government, and the task is the "securing" of Baghdad. The basic question is, who is in charge of the effort to try to quell sectarian violence in Baghdad? Since mosts of the new American troops will be sent to Baghdad and may occupy between 30-40 new "secruity centers" in the capital, someone has to be in charge of what they do. Or, more urgently, someone has to be in charge of the total operation to pacify Baghdad.

So, Who's In Charge?

John Burns reports that Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Makiki has named a "virtually unknown" Shiite commander, Lt. Gen. Aboud Qanbar, to head the "partnership" between the American and Iraqi armies in Baghdad. But here is the problem, as he explains:

"For the Americans, accustomed to clear operational control, the partnership concept is troublesome--full of potential, some officers fear, for dispute with the Iraqis over tough issues like the equal targeting of Shiite and Sunni lawbreakers," NYT, 1/15/07, p. A6.

So, how will we establish this "partnership" when we have been saying all along that America doesn't want to be constrained by the limitations of partnerships? Well, it still isn't clear whether the prime minister himself will be in charge of this new "crackdown" or that perhaps a "compromise" proposal, where a committee of senior Iraqi and American soldiers would be "in charge" will rule the day. But, just as our noble Vice-President, Mr. Dick Cheney, has just said that "wars are not fought by committee," so we wonder how this committee, if it exists at all, will function to fight a war.

The Problem "On the Ground"

The daily problems on the ground that this new "partnered" security effort will face are illustrated in the execution of Saddam Hussein. We held the guy but we were unable to keep ourselves, against all better judgment, from handing him over to the Iraqis when they demanded him. This is what will now happen in Baghdad. The Americans will develop a plan of how to "secure" Baghdad, but the Iraqis will want their own plan, too. It will be a bit lenient on the Shia of course. Whose will win? Well, we want their independence and "freedom," we say, and so we will eventually have to yield to the Iraqi desires. But we really don't want to. We really don't want to be in the partnership at all, in fact, but we have been "forced" to it.

The moral of the story: Don't try to go it alone in the international arena of the 21st century. The more you try to go it alone, the more you will be forced into bad partnerships down the road. Another lesson regrettably learned.

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