William Perry at Home

William Perry was President Clinton's first Secretary of Defense (1993-97) and one of the ten members of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group ("ISG" or "Group") which recently delivered its final report. The members, five from each party, were selected by Congress in March 2006 because of their "centrist" tendencies. The point of the Group was to suggest a way forward in Iraq because both parties in Congress perceived that we were going nowhere in Iraq and that a new approach was desired. Since the report was released last week the report has been attacked by extremists on both ends of the political spectrum. The far right has called it "stupid" or "absurd" or "rubbish." The New York Post characterized the two distinguished co-chairs of the Group, Lee Hamilton and James Baker, as "surrender monkeys." The left has called the report "too little, too late." The fact that the Group's report has been panned by both extremes without much reflection on it shows not simply how hopelessly this war has divided the American people but how tall an order the ISG had in coming up with its recommendations. The purpose of this and the next essay is to discuss how a centrist, William Perry, defined the issues and suggested "solutions" in an intimate chat yesterday. Well, here is what I mean.

Setting the Context

I was visiting my mother yesterday in her new home at the Classic Residence by Hyatt near the Stanford Shopping Center. A fellow resident, William Perry, was going to give the "Friday lecture" made available to the residents. I knew we would have to get there early for his talk, and so we arrived in the comfortable auditorium at 3:00 p.m for his 3:30 talk. The auditorium was set up for a capacity crowd, with about 200 chairs filling the room. About 500 residents live in the home, so 200 chairs are more than enough to accommodate almost any audience. By the time we arrived for the talk at 3:00, however, the room was already about 1/3 full. I guess the old adage held true--The way to make sure that people show up on time is to make sure it is the oldest, slowing-moving people, who are invited. Younger people think they can just "blow into" anything, older people know better. They bring books and magazines and camp out waiting for the big event.

And so they came, the hale and hearty and those who were moving more slowly. Some walked into the room with erect carriage; others parked their walkers or scooters in an ample anteroom to the auditorium. The residents in this retirement community are mostly people of considerable accomplishment. As I was sitting there talking to my mother, she pointed out various people. There was a Nobel Prize winner; there was a former business executive who sold his computer company decades ago for millions; there were two or three well-known retired Stanford professors. Instead of studying my Italian, I found myself just watching the way that older people congregated, waited, ambled along and prepared themselves. Soon, however, all the seats were taken. People began to lean against posts, to rest themselves on ledges around the room, even to sit on the stage where Perry was to speak. There is no question that only this question could have drawn such a large crowd. The Iraq War is clearly on everyone's mind. They even put off the lighting of the Hannukah candles until after dark in order to accommodate Perry's presentation and discussion. I also had the opportunity to speak briefly to him afterwards and pose some questions I had. He was gracious in his answers, precise in his words and serious in his approach.

William Perry's Approach

His PowerPoint presentation lasted about 30 minutes. He first talked about the Group's dynamics (for example, James Baker kicked Rudy Guiliani out of the Group because he missed the first two meetings) and process. It was appointed in March; it met for two or three days per month over the next six months; it visited Iraq for a four-day intensive series of meetings with the American military, Iraqi leaders and others early in September, and then met together for a total of ten days in the past two months as they tried to come up with consensus on the report. That a consensus could be established (i.e., there was no "minority report") does not suggest that this is the best way forward. Consensuses are built for a number of reasons beyond it being the "best" thing to do. Yet, we ought not to dismiss the consensus report too quickly, as if it is insignificant.

Before giving the "leading points" of the report, he laid out some of the "background" to understand the current War in Iraq. He was adamant that we needed to understand "how we got there" if we are truly to understand how we ought to extricate ourselves. The remainder of this essay will mention our three justifications for war in Iraq. The next essay will examine six problems that we have created, according to Perry, in the 3 1/2 years since we have been in Iraq and how we might proceed.

The Three Justifications for Invasion

We invaded Iraq for three reasons: (1) because Iraq was supposed to have Weapons of Mass Destruction that placed the United States in imminent danger of an attack; (2) because we felt that Iraq was cooperating with Al-Qaeda in supporting international terrorisim; and (3) because we wanted to establish an island of democracy in the Arab Middle East in such a way that it would be a beacon to other states contemplating their future as well as a protection for Israel and other US interests in the Middle East. Because we didn't wait for the final United Nations report to tell us if there were, in fact, WMD in Iraq, we ended up invading without the support either of a UN resolution (unlike the first Gulf War) or of many European allies. But the spirit in America in 2002, as I recall it, was that we were right, we didn't really need help from others, we would kick butt quickly, and that we, as America would achieve our objectives. As time has gone on, we see how arrogant this attitude is/was.

The second reason for invasion also wasn't substantiated. The third might be a desirable aim, but it scarcely supports invading a foreign land. Indeed, if we used that as a justification for invading another country, another country may some day use it for invading us. We were painting ourselves, therefore, into a corner by invading in 2003. However, America was in a rather frenzied state in those days, as I recall. We were willing to give a lot of authority to the President to "fight terror" because we felt we didn't have resources to do it any other way. So, we invaded Iraq in Spring 2003. "Shock and Awe" happened. Then, slowly, reality dawned. The next essay describes this "reality."

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