lucid interval and tort law and restatement of torts and section 455

As I argued at the end of the previous essay, with the objective theory of contract formation coming to the fore in the 19th century the way was cleared to consider contracts or sales of lunatics to be permissible under some circumstances. Some authorities argued that these contracts/sales were not void; they were merely voidable--able to be disaffirmed (or ratified) upon the passing away of the insane condition. Other courts became even more "modern," holding that since the objective view of contracts was the norm and the "intention" of the party was irrelevant, then there was nothing really preventing an insane person from making a contract, especially if it was one that had all the indicia of fairness. Yet, as Williston says, "It was indeed recognized from early times that a lunatic might enjoy lucid intervals and contracts made during such intervals have been regarded as good" (Williston on Sales, 1st ed. (1909), at 41). Thus, we really have three categories of contract/sales actions here: (1) an action by a lunatic, which may be disaffirmed upon recovery of sanity; (2) an action by a lunatic, which might be held legitimate regardless of later disaffirmance or ratification, as long as the contract appeared to be a fair one; and (3) an action by a lunatic who may, however, have been acting in a "lucid interval" of his insanity, thus resulting in a binding contract or sale. You can see, by these categories, how courts were encouraging plaintiffs to plead in the alternative and defendants to develop a "lucid interval"-type of answer.

But then Williston takes us down a very short detour by distinguishing between a contract made by a lunatic and one made simply by a dumb person. I like this phrasing: "Mere weakness of mind or a condition approaching imbecility is not sufficient to constitute what the law regards as insanity" (41). Once the plaintiff establishes his insanity, however, the burden shifts to defendant to show that the transaction took place while plaintiff was in a lucid interval. Then, Williston further qualifies this by saying that this rule "has been denied if the insanity is only occasional and intermittent." That is, how can you claim you have a "lucid interval" if your insanity is only intermittent in the first place? Isn't the psychology of the human that lies behind these characterizations wonderful? Law must put people, as well as their minds, into "bright line" categories, even if the realities of mental affliction are far different. In any case, we now know what a "lucid interval" is with respect to lunatics for the purpose of contract or sales law.

Lucid Intervals in Trusts and Estates

One of the interesting and frequently-litigated issues in will contests is what lawyers call the "testamentary capacity" of the one who made the will. State law requires that a testator be of sound mind, though this doesn't mean that the person must be mentally sharp, reasonable or fair. A sound mind, for trusts and estates law, means that a person must be aware of the nature and extent of his/her property and the people who are normally regarded as the natural objects of the testator's bounty (i.e., children or relatives). But often wills are drawn up or revised during times of a testator's mental deterioration. Sometimes the person may have good days and, well, you know the opposite. But, what is the legal category or principle which determines if a revised will/new will or a person with deteriorating mind is valid?

Well, it is whether s/he had "lucid intervals" during the process of mental deterioration. If the will was written or revised during one of these "lucid intervals," it remains valid. Those arguing for validity of revisions would first claim that the person was of sound mind through the whole process; their back-up position (called their alternative theory of the case) is that even if the person was insane, s/he had a "lucid interval" when s/he made the changes. Thus, cases worth millions can sometimes boil down to a judge's determination of whether a mentally-limited person had a lucid interval.

Moving to the Law of Torts

Lucid intervals also make their appearance in a very specialized area of tort law. The Restatement (2nd) of Torts laid out the following principle in its discussion of "Acts done during insanity caused by negligent conduct" (Sec. 455).

"If the actor's negligent conduct so brings about the delirium or insanity of another as to make the actor liable for it, the actor is also liable for harm done by the other to himself while delirious or insane, if his delirium or insanity....(b) makes it impossible for him to resist an impulse caused by his insanity which deprives him of his capacity to govern his conduct in accordance with reason."

This carefully worded rule is meant to apply in a case where a person is injured, possibly by being struck by a vehicle, and the injury so affects his/her mental condition that s/he then commits suicide or injures the self further. The Restatement, which is supposed to be a statement of what the law is (or should be) based on the "better" reasoning in various cases, is built upon the assumption that rules of law are discernible and extractable from a wide variety of divergent fact patterns. This "rule" seems to suggest the continuing liability of the tortfeasor for the actions of the injured person if his/her reason was, as it were, taken away by the injury [again, we see the mechanical nature of law's words].

But how does "lucid interval" enter here? Well, in Comment d. we have an "on the other hand" statement which reminds us very much of Williston's qualifications above:

"On the other hand, the fact that the actor's negligence causes harm to another which subjects him to recurrent attacks of extreme melancholia does not make the actor liable for death or other harm which the other deliberately inflicts upon himself during a lucid interval in an effort to terminate his life because of his dread of the increasingly frequent recurrence of these attacks."

Conclusion

Isn't law wonderful? Law not only provides rules but also provides exceptions to the rules and ways in which the exceptions may, actually, negate the rules. "Lucid interval" is the great negator in this case.

I need one more essay to introduce one more area of law where "lucid interval" is used, and then show how it may have entered into English speech in the 14th century.

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