rush to war and war in Iraq and national security strategy

On September 20, 2002, just a little over a year after the "9/11" attacks on the United States, President Bush promulgated a new National Security Strategy for the nation. This 30-page document was briefly discussed in the media when it was released. The more time passes from its release, however, the more I see it as the crucial document that explains and justifies the invasion of Iraq. The longer-range question arising from this document is whether it will fundamentally alter the nature of international law in our time, especially as it relates to issues of self-defense or attack on other nations. The purpose of this essay is to lay out the structure and spirit of the document, with special attention to those crucial paragraphs where a new national security strategy is explained and defended.

The "Shape" of the Report

The report is divided into nine sections, with a three-page introduction signed by the President. The overall spirit of the document is that times have changed since the end of the Cold War and that we need to revamp our security apparatus and philosophy in order to meet the new threats of our day. In our day threats to our security are apt to come not so much from well-established nations as from a shadowy network of groups who practice "terrorism," which is defined as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents" (p. 11; the pagination is from the PDF version, since page numbers aren't provided in text of the report itself). In order to ward off this threat, we need to develop a multi-pronged approach that will not only fight the terrorists directly but seek to undermine their funding bases. This new strategy will also seek to champion aspirations for human dignity, promote economic development around the world, strengthen our strategic alliances (I didn't notice the mention of the United Nations very often in the report, however) and promote freedom. Indeed, the word freedom is as close as one can get to a sort of mantra that permeates this document. President Bush's final introductory paragraph reaches this peroration:

"Freedom is the non-negotiable demand of human dignity; the birthright of every person—in every civilization. Throughout history, freedom has been threatened by war and terror; it has been challenged by the clashing wills of powerful states and the evil designs of tyrants; and it has been tested by widespread poverty and disease. Today, humanity holds in its hands the opportunity to further freedom’s triumph over all these foes. The United States welcomes our responsibility to lead in this great mission" (p. 5).

Some people might even be excused if they read between the lines of this document and see the word "freedom" functioning similarly to Teddy Roosevelt's "Speak softly," in his famous maxim: "Speak softly but carry a big stick."

Redefining a Security Standard

But the most striking sections of the report* are Sections III

[*There are some single line zingers in the report which I will not comment on here. Among them are more than one line which seems to target the Muslim world, a commitment to work with nations who obey international law when our invasion in 2003 has been questioned from the perspective of international law and the emphasis on the Evangelical word "transformation" which suffuses the last section of the report. One particular statement caught my attention, however. Section III ("Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism....") deals with new security arrangements. One of these has to do with domestic emergency management. The report says: "For example, emergency management systems will be better able to cope not just with terrorism but with all hazards.. [including] mass-casualty dangers" (pp. 12-13). Can you say Katrina? In fact, the language of the report ought to be subject to a close rhetorical analysis, especially our repeated aspirations to "destroy" terrorism.]

("Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and Work to Prevent Attacks Against Us and Our Friends") and V ("Prevent our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction"). The first mention of this new strategy is on p. 12, where we pledge we will "disrupt and destroy" terrorist organizations by:

"defending the US, the American people, and our interests at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders. While the US will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists..."

These final words are the crucial ones--to exercise our right of self-defense by activing preemptively. The major question I cannot address in this essay is how this relates to our responsibilities and commitments under the United Nations Charter with respect to the principles (only attack when attacked or when an imminent threat looms) which we endorsed. That is, in this one sentence, or part of a sentence, the President is providing more elasticisity to the concept of self-defense than has been done by any US President since WWII.

Again, Preemptive Strikes Possible

This tone and content pervades Section V of the Report also.

"We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the US and our allies and friends. Our response must take full advantage of strengthened alliances, the establishemnt of new partnerships....We must deter and defend against the threat before it is unleashed (p.18)."

The theory behind the report, then, is that we live in new and dangerous times, and that this preemptive-strike possibility must be placed in our quiver/arsenal in order to enable us to meet the terrorists on their own terms. The "terrorists" may have weapons of mass destruction that they can unleash on the world. To sit around and wait for an attack would be suicidal.

Conclusion

The philosophy of unilateral national defense through preemptive strike capabilities, even though recognition is given to some historical international partnerships, means that we are potentially in a brave new world of international relations. I believe, now with three + years hindsight, that the release of this document was a signal to the world that we were going to invade Iraq and that there was nothing that anyone could do to stop us. Reconsidering this September 2002 National Security Strategy Report, then, can also help us debate more intelligently whether, in fact, there was a "rush to war" in the Fall of 2002 and the Winter of 2003.

1527